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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to clarify the educational role and effects of hermeneutic practice. The 
argument is that far from becoming irrelevant to the ever changing needs of the social economy, 
the humanities and especially the hermeneutic practices on which they depend, are vital to 
intensifying those processes of social and cultural renewal upon which the well-being of a 
community depends.  
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Statement of Aims 
 
This paper endeavours to demonstrate that hermeneutic practices have indirect formative 
educative effects that are key to processes of social transformation and re-vitalisation. Not only 
do hermeneutic processes interpret cultural change but they can initiate it. The argument does not 
seek to legitimise hermeneutic practice by subsuming it within a preferred educational ideology. 
This would instrumentalise hermeneutic practice as a means of achieving pre-defined objectives 
and render it a tool of social management. Such an outcome could not have been further from 
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Gadamer’s mind when he argued that the task of university education is to allow individuals to 
create their own free spaces and for them to move there in (Gadamer, 1992, p. 59). It is precisely 
the non-utility of hermeneutic practices which make them so vital to education and to 
encouraging those processes of experiential transformation upon which cultural and economic 
rejuvenation depend. 
 
To understand the relevance of hermeneutic practices to both humanities education and the task 
of social renewal, we need to think about philosophical hermeneutics differently. We need to 
take a step beyond Gadamer and consider the anthropological dimensions of hermeneutic 
practice and their effects. With this step, the educational and socially generative powers of 
hermeneutic practice will become apparent. This also has a bearing upon how post-Gadamerian 
hermeneutics might develop. 
 
Working within a Heideggerian architectonic, Gadamer establishes the philosophical pre-
conditions governing the possibility of understanding. These articulated ontologically are that 
any literary or historical experience of meaning is preconditioned by the enabling fact of 
existence within the horizons of language and tradition. Appropriately, the nature of cultural and 
historical transmission figures prominently in Gadamer’s reflections. The argument that a 
cultural work is historically constituted by its effects is central to Hans Jauss’s and Wolfgang 
Iser’s development of reception theory.1 The latter reveals what is missing from Gadamer’s 
position: A clear account of how the processes of historical transmission work. This is not fully 
given by Iser but his emphasis upon the effects of interpretation-practices moves in an 
appropriate direction. Gadamer’s hermeneutics provides a classic explication of what 
hermeneutic practice pre-supposes but leaves the key question unanswered: What is it about the 
givens of tradition and linguisticality that render hermeneutic practice transformatively effective 
in experiential terms? What are the operative “mechanics” of hermeneutic practice through 
which its effects are generated? If we can understand the mechanics of hermeneutic practice, we 
can appreciate their effects and if we can understand how they are achieved, we can understand 
the pivotal educational importance of hermeneutic practice. The transformative effects of 
hermeneutic practice (and hence their educational significance) are a consequence of (1) 
interpretation’s anticipation of completeness being applied within, (2), the indeterminate 
horizons of linguistic meaning. The social and educational relevance of hermeneutics is a 
consequence of the productive tension between the aims of hermeneutic practice—the 
achievement of completion—and the environment of linguistic indeterminacy in which that 
achievement is pursued.  
 
The Practice Turn 
 
Why the practice turn within hermeneutic reflection? Without reflecting on the nature of 
hermeneutic practice itself we will fail to grasp its educational importance. To do this we need to 
think about hermeneutics slightly differently: we need to consider hermeneutic practices from the 
“outside” as it were, and seek to grasp the mechanisms which both institute and constitute 
hermeneutic experience. We need to ask not what these mechanisms are for but what do they do? 
To understand what something does, is to understand its effects.  
                                                 
1 See in particular Wolfgang Iser (2000), The Range of Interpretation, New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press. 
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We must start to think of hermeneutics as something other than a variety of interpretive methods 
evolved toward pre-defined objectives irrespective of whether they be philological correction or 
the reconstruction of a rational intentionality. Nietzsche was on to something when he 
commented, “the most valuable insights are methods”: The instituting of practices generates the 
valuable insight (Nietzsche, 1968, sec 469). It is not the objective of a hermeneutic practice that 
matters but what the pursuit of that objective engenders irrespective of any prior intention.  
  
The social and educational importance of hermeneutic practices lies in their ability to induce 
serendipitous events which can have significant effects on the horizons of understanding within 
which they are applied. Nietzsche’s observation that a thought strikes us of its own accord rather 
than when we want it to is correct (Nietzsche, 1973, part 1, sec 17), yet, this does not mean that 
emergences or epiphanies of insight originate ex nihilo. To the contrary, they are an effect of the 
fact that the matrix of human understanding is instituted by a constant interplay of multiple 
horizons of understanding, some linguistic, some cultural and others biographical. The 
serendipitous emergences of insight are the effect of participating in the multiple horizons of 
understanding which constitute our lifeworld. If so, the question is how to keep these different 
horizons of understanding in play for it is from out of this play that the serendipitous event of 
transformative experience can arise. 
 
Emergence and Emergency 
 
The emergence of new insight and meanings is never ex nihilo but contextual: It presupposes 
intellectual, linguistic, and historical horizons from within which new perspectives arise. Albeit 
that these horizons operate within historical a priori structures of reception, they are finite, 
permeable, and unstable. Their instability reflects the fact that their constituting subject-matters 
are open-ended frameworks of meaning constantly susceptible to re-interpretation. Such 
indeterminacy of meaning is vital to the humanities allowing its meanings to alter and accrue 
historically: It always permits something more to be said and the disclosure of unexpected 
determinations of meaning that the contingencies of our historical or linguistic location often 
prevent us from seeing. Put another way, the effects that hermeneutic practices achieve depend 
on the contexts of linguistic indeterminacy in which they operate. The productivity of 
hermeneutic practice (its ability to disrupt established meanings and create new ones) is 
dependent upon an incommensurable relation: the horizon of linguistic indeterminacy in which 
hermeneutic practices operate, will always be at odds with the quest for completeness they 
pursue. At least three factors render this incommensurability productive: the pursuit of 
excellence within a practice; the quest for a firmer grasp of a founding truth within a practice; 
and, finally, the generative capacities of interpretative practices themselves.  
  
With regard to excellence, hermeneutic practices also generate instability within received 
horizons of understanding because of their normative nature. Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that 
practices have built into them socially developed expectations of excellence (MacIntyre, 1993, p. 
187). Excellence is always contentious and by its nature provokes disagreement and debate. 
What is more, contested traditions are more often than not intellectually vibrant ones. However, 
it is not just the normative quest for a more articulate interpretation that drives a hermeneutic 
practice; it is also the incompleteness of its grounding understanding.  
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Concerning the quest for a firmer grasp of a founding truth, no historical community owns its 
truths or meanings. Each requires historical time to fill out their content. As Rowan Williams 
argues, “there is an indefinite time opened up for (the) reception and interpretation (of such 
truths); (their) object is located outside the closures of specific conflicts and settlements of 
interest” (Williams, 2012, p. 15). Precisely because no community can assert complete authority 
over its truths without denying their transcendent nature, that community is exposed to 
recognizing the possibility that a foreign tradition may hold an unseen aspect of its own founding 
truths. The impetus to closure (which is not to say it is achievable) produces instability: by 
seeking in the foreign a completer understanding of its own position, a community opens itself to 
truth claims other than its own.  
 
Turning to the generative capacities of interpretive practices, the fragmented nature of 
experience also has us looking for threads of narrative completeness so that we can make sense 
of our historical predicament. Gadamer talks in Truth and Method of an anticipation of 
completeness whereby we strive to eliminate the undecided and ambiguous in experience and 
achieve a completion of meaning such that no lines of meaning scatter in the void (Gadamer, 
1960/1989, p. 113). The point is not whether such a completion can be achieved but that such 
quests often provoke new and unexpected alignments of the part-whole relationships that 
constitute human experience. Interpretation emerges as a practice of proliferation generating 
additional possibilities from within the subject-matters shaping our horizons.  
 
In summary, we have argued that the conditions governing the emergence of new insight and 
meaning involve the following. (1) Hermeneutic practices always operate contextually within 
horizons from which new perspectives arise. (2) Practices are normative in that they seek from 
within their operational horizons more precise articulations of their subject-matters. (3) The 
impetus to completeness drives a practice to confront alien perspectives. (4) Hermeneutic 
differentials (the incommensurable gap between how a subject-matter is conceived and how it is 
applied) renders interpretation not a practice of closure but one of proliferation. The dynamics of 
proliferation relate to the incommensurability at the heart of hermeneutic practice.  
 
The infinity of meaning that constitutes the linguistic horizon of understanding spurs 
hermeneutic practices toward a completer grasp of their incompletely grasped truths. Yet, 
precisely, because of the infinite relatedness of linguistic meaning, the more hermeneutic 
practices seek closure, the more they open other possibilities of meaning capable of challenging 
the truths they have a slim grip on. No practice owns its subject-matter. The indefiniteness of 
meaning surrounding them allows them to function more as open constellations of concern rather 
than as determinate concepts. I might as an 18th century aesthetician believe that the pursuit of 
beauty embraces a humanizing concern with balance, harmony and proportion. The author of the 
Iliad knew otherwise: Helen of Troy’s beauty is connected with disharmony, misery and war. 
Any Cartesian or Idealist aesthetician advocating the humanizing virtue of beauty must also 
contend with its darker maddening powers. 
 
The ability of hermeneutic practices to generate meanings does not just depend upon their 
subject-matters standing in an opaque field of meaning. It also requires that different fields 
repeatedly inter-penetrate one another. Subject-matters always reside in other words. They are in 
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Rosenzweig’s term “indefinable:” Temporary historical articulations of meaning that because of 
the inter-relatedness of all linguistic meaning, contain an infinity of possible meanings yet to be 
drawn out from them. It is also clear that linguistic meanings can cross and penetrate multiple 
horizons of concern. Like concepts, they “cut-across one another” (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 379). 
Nothing is commoner, Wittgenstein argues, for the meaning of an expression to oscillate, for a 
phenomenon to be regarded sometimes as a symptom, sometimes a criterion, of a state of affairs 
(p. 438). A shift of meaning, a new semantic emergence, in one horizon can create an emergency 
in another. Does this introduce an insurmountable negativity into the argument? 
 
The capacity of hermeneutic practices to generate disruptive effects within established bodies of 
meaning seems to concede the critical case to post-structuralist and deconstructive critics of 
hermeneutics and the humanities. In formal terms, it would appear that deconstruction is indeed 
correct. The finite nature of understanding combined with the infinite horizon of linguistic 
meaning conspire to guarantee that there can be no final interpretation. Nevertheless, the finitude 
of understanding allows accrual and exchange between perspectives. However, the inconclusive 
openness that deconstruction derides in hermeneutics is precisely what an education in the 
humanities depends on. Indeed, from within the perspective of the humanities, the demand for 
certainty and a final interpretation is incoherent. An end-interpretation which realized all the 
possible determinations of a subject matter’s meaning would foreclose those free spaces of 
possibility from within which new learning and action may arise. Furthermore, in times of social 
and economic upheaval it is precisely the practices that question institutionalized understandings 
and open new possibilities or understanding that are needed. The capacity of hermeneutic 
practices to achieve unintended effects that place our perspectives in a new light accords them 
the agency of change. Coming to understand through the temporal diversity of experience a 
greater number of a subject matter’s possible determinations, allows that subject-matter to 
become in Gadamer’s phrase “more what it is.” This, however, is not the only salient educative 
point. 
 
The drive by hermeneutic practice to overcome the differentials of understanding may 
productively displace established perspectives on canonical texts (and thereby remind us of the 
finitude of our judgment) but it affects another more personal dimension of our understanding. 
When I write about a certain philosophical problem professionally, I do so from within a 
specialist academic practice with a well-defined objective: To achieve a more adequate 
understanding of a hermeneutic issue. Blanks in an interpretation may need filling out and, for 
the sake of its credibility, inconsistencies removed. This formal exercise does not just take place 
within the horizon of philosophical tradition but also within the existential horizons of my 
understanding. These horizons are not discrete. Like concepts and subject-matters, they inter-
leave and over-lap. Linguality guarantees this. Questions of what it means to be a good husband, 
a good citizen or a European are not just for moral and political philosophy. They are questions 
which probe my self-understanding and identity. As Wittgenstein remarks, subject-matters and 
concepts “cut-across one another” (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 379). A shift of meaning in one 
horizon can create an emergency in another. The anticipation of completeness is not just a 
feature of academic practice but a projective structure within all human experience. Experience 
is full of contradictions, unresolved questions and unrealized expectations that we yearn to make 
sense of, complete and fulfil. The partial coherence of such experience suggests the possibility of 
an as yet undiscovered insight that might render the presently incoherent, narratively coherent. 
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The horizon of academic life may (because of professionalization) be increasingly separated 
from that of the everyday but Gadamer’s notion of linguality shows that it is not. What sensitizes 
me to the discovery of new meanings and to changes in established ones is that as a human being 
of incomplete experience, I am always alert to the configurations of meaning that might make 
sense of a key problem or difficulty. An anticipation of completeness is as cardinal feature of 
lived-experience as it is of reading a novel. This suggests that whilst the anticipation of 
completeness drives hermeneutic practice toward a fuller articulation of a subject-matter’s 
meaning, its generation of new meanings might have unanticipated consequences for my self-
understanding. This offers purchase on the questions of how hermeneutic practices produce 
unexpected effects within the matrix of understanding. The argument returns us to the two 
operative principles (1) the indeterminacy of linguistic meaning and (2) the impetus to 
completion.  
 
Hermeneutic Effects 
 
The unexpected effects of understanding are the result of what is already at play within our 
hermeneutic horizons. This involves the indeterminacy of linguistic meaning and the drive to 
completion. Regarding (1), the indeterminacy of linguistic meaning; the principle establishes the 
logical basis of the claim that by virtue of being a language speaker I am connected to networks 
of meaning I am not presently conscious of. In other words, the transformative effects of 
hermeneutic practice are a consequence of the inter-relatedness of linguistic meaning. Only 
because the term “leisure” is already etymologically connected to the latin scola could the 
discovery of that connection transform my hitherto limited grasp of the word. The term has little 
to do with modern notions of relaxation but more with achieving a freedom from everyday labors 
in order to learn and contemplate. It was an inarticulate anticipation of a better account of 
aesthetic disinterest that prompted an enquiry into the connections between leisure and dis-
interested looking. Hermeneutic practice did the rest. Because of the etymological connections 
between leisure, scola and seeing disinterestedly, a new meaning of aesthetic community arose. 
The point is simply this: the transformative effects of this localized hermeneutic practice were 
the direct consequence of that practice’s anticipation of completeness exposing and animating 
hidden conceptual connections within the indeterminate horizon of linguality. It is the pursuit of 
a better, more comprehensive interpretation which can both expand and unsettle commitments to 
meaning in the horizons within which that completer interpretation is pursued. This re-iterates 
the observation that hermeneutic practice is performative: It produces emergent phenomena 
capable of equally expanding and disrupting established meanings. A key meaning of the verb to 
educate is to draw or lead out. Hermeneutic practice achieves this. A hermeneutic account of 
education will have little to do with technical training but more to do with freeing spaces in 
which new alignments of meaning can arise.  
  
Concerning (2) the capacity of the impetus to completion to induce unexpected effects in the 
matrix of understanding; some of Wittgenstein’s comments about interpretation are insightful. In 
Zettel he comments,  
 
1. …to interpret, to give the final interpretation which is not a further sign  or picture, but 
something else—the thing that cannot be further interpreted. But what we have 
reached is a psychological, not a logical terminus. (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 231) 
Davey  Journal of Applied Hermeneutics 2017 Article 8    7 
 
2. What happens is not that this symbol cannot (logically speaking) be further interpreted, 
but: I do no (more) interpreting. I do not interpret because I feel at home in the present 
picture. When I interpret, I step from one level of thought to another. (1967, p. 234) 
 
That hermeneutics grants (a) that all linguistic meaning is indeterminate and (b) that there is no 
end to interpretation, seems to render the drive to completeness logically futile. It is, however, 
not the achievement of completion that matters but what the quest for it gives rise to, its effects, 
as it were. Wittgenstein recognises this. That there is no end, logically speaking, to the ways a 
symbol may be interpreted does not mean that a practical closure of interpretation is impossible. 
Wittgenstein’s remark that I do no more interpreting when I have reached a psychological 
terminus clearly implies that I stop interpreting, that I reach a sort of hermeneutic (though not a 
logical) terminus. The question is, what is it that induces me to stop? Gadamer might argue that I 
stop interpreting when the text or art work speaks to me, that is, when a certain hermeneutic 
closure of meaning occurs. For Wittgenstein I stop interpreting when I feel at ease within a 
certain framework of meaning: I know how to move around it as if I were at home within it. 
Practical closure is achieved: no longer am I standing outside a framework of meaning analysing 
it, as it were, but have returned inside it and know how to proceed according to its rules. I do no 
more interpreting because of something already at play in my understanding. It is precisely 
because I carry within me a whole range of unanswered questions and unresolved experiences 
that I am vulnerable to the sudden emergence of an image or phrase which can unexpectedly 
bring those experiences and questions into a meaningful frame. This does not imply that the 
meaning of ambiguous text or experience has been found. As Wittgenstein’s position implies, the 
text logically speaking can always be further interpreted. Nevertheless, the fact remains that I 
stop interpreting and I refrain from further hermeneutic activity and arguably I do so because a 
chance epiphany of meaning answers an unresolved ambiguity active in my horizons of 
understandings. Furthermore, the quest for closure in one framework may give rise 
serendipitously to a whole range of unexpected associations of meaning which though they 
might not achieve the sought after closure in one discourse might nevertheless resolve 
ambiguities in other horizons of concern. An example might be instructive.  
  
What did Nietzsche mean when he asserted that it was of the utmost importance to give style to 
one’s life? Pursuing this question will give rise to a parallel concern with the shaping power of 
narrative structure. Style and narrative both offer ways of giving unity to multiplicities but, as 
always, the question is which structure to choose? Argument is truly engaged: Followers of 
Galen Strawson on the one hand and Alasdair MacIntyre on the other dispute whether with 
human life becomes insufferably restricted by the imposition of a narrative structure upon it, or 
becomes quite unintelligible without it. Strawson’s scepticism reflects a criticism made of 
Gadamer. When Gadamer argues that an encounter with art reveals the “hermeneutic continuity 
of human existence,” he has no right (it is claimed) to assume without warrant that life has such a 
continuity. Now, it would be churlish to suppose that these issues concern just academic charge 
and counter-charge. They also speak to how we orientate ourselves to experience. A chance 
remark of Wittgenstein offered a serendipitous solution to both the formal and existential 
dimensions of Nietzsche’s question. The key hermeneutic point is that the remark could not have 
done so had my academic and personal horizons not already attuned me to the possibility of an 
answer. Wittgenstein remarks that “seeing life as a weave” implies a “pattern” that “is not always 
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complete and is varied in a multiplicity of ways” (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 568). The argument is, 
then, that there is no narrative or style to be imposed on life; there is no continuity which a life 
has. Much rather, it is a question of drawing out the implications of those possibilities already at 
play within one’s horizons. It is the ever changing patterns of one’s involvements that gives 
sense to, give style to a life, not any narrative imposed upon it. The question of what style to 
adopt for one’s life arguably disappears. It becomes a question of becoming more what one is, 
that is, of pursuing the concerns and interests already at play within one’s existence. The salient 
point is that Nietzsche’s question and its existential implications sensitize and pre-dispose me to 
Wittgenstein’s remark. I am hermeneutically primed to be receptive to it for it offers a way of 
closing the problematic that Nietzsche’s question opened. I no longer interpret Nietzsche’s 
question because I have found a way of living within its entailments.  
 
Formally speaking, my way of living with Nietzsche’s question does not constitute a logical 
terminus to its interpretation. The indeterminacy of linguistic meaning implies that the nature of 
the question and its possible answers always remain open. Yet the hermeneutic effect (my 
response) is not arbitrary: it touches on sensitive issues within my existential horizons. 
Wittgenstein’s remark meets what my anticipation of completeness strives for. However, though 
the solution may fit the needs of my present existential horizons, it always remains vulnerable to 
the challenge of future experience. 
 
Education: Hermeneutics as Disruption 
 
At the heart of this argument is an anthropological speculation: Change and its challenge is 
fundamental to human existence. Gadamer indicates that understanding is never stable but 
always reflects the type of beings-in motion that we are (Gadamer, 1989, p. xxx). What he 
describes as the negativity of experience—the capacity of change to disrupt expectancy—has 
always disturbed human beings. Academia is not immune from such disruption. There is no 
doubt that the global economic crisis and the merchandising of university education pose serious 
challenges to the teaching of the humanities. Their lack of obvious material productivity in a 
shrinking economy questions their contribution to social wealth. However, educating 
communities only in today’s productive technologies in effect condemns them to future 
redundancy. It is the capacity to meet social and economic change that matters, not the short-
term ability to render oneself safe from a challenge that will always return. The contrast between 
technological and humanities based education is in this respect stark. The implementation of 
technological systems demands the elimination of chance and disruption. The well-being of the 
humanities demands the opposite: The generation of chance and disruption. Only in times of 
paradigm crises are technological disciplines forced to re-appraise their operating parameters 
where as in the humanities, the dynamics and context of hermeneutic practice guarantee to keep 
their self-understanding in permanent crisis. This is a point of dual importance. 
  
1. The significance of hermeneutic practice within the humanities is that it offers 
experiences both of change and disruption and of learning how to control such 
“negativity of experience” in safe and creative ways. This is the vital relevance of the 
humanities to the social economy: Using personal experience it teaches how to react 
positively and creatively to the demands of radical change. In times of crisis who is 
more deployable: those trained in systemized logics of the same and the repeatable or 
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those who have acquired the disruptive skills of creative thinking and who can 
confront difference, disruption and change? If humanities academics thought more of 
the hermeneutic effects of their practices, their economic and social value would be 
self-evident. 
 
2. From an anthropological perspective, the provocation of change is fundamental to the 
development and testing of human capacities. Francisco Varela, the Brazilian 
phenomenologist and anthropologist, speculates that if human beings had a fixed 
essence with a determinate set of response repertoires, human survival in a world of 
constant flux would have been comprised long ago: “Living systems are autopoietic 
insofar as they have no essence that they could appeal to or draw from in order to 
function” (Varela, 1979, p. 107). “As the system has no essence, it must avail itself 
of… previous behavioural patterns and processes potentially all the efforts it has made 
to ensure self-maintenance” (Iser, 1968/2000, p. 105). For Michael Oakeshott, we are 
essentially narrative creating creatures, continually assessing collected experience 
discursively. The importance of hermeneutic practices within the humanities is that 
they institute mechanisms for constantly probing received wisdom. Their importance 
for education and social rejuvenation resides in their capacity for generating controlled 
disruption.  
  
Part of the persuasiveness of Varela’s argument is that it links Gadamer’s account of education 
with its idealist background. Varela presents the organic nature of human life as a system that 
“has no goal outside itself.” “It must take up what it has already developed earlier as guidance 
for maintaining self-organisation” (Iser, 1968/2000, p. 105). “Recursive history allows the 
system to reactivate its own past as an interlocked history of structural transformations” (p. 105). 
These remarks compare well with Gadamer’s presentation of Bildung as the self-formation of 
human beings through self-education, a complex notion which has roots in philosophical 
romanticism.  
 
Bildung is not achieved in the manner of a technical construction, but grows out of an 
inner process of formation and cultivation, and therefore remains in a state of continual 
Bildung… Like Nature, Bildung has no goals outside itself… In having no goals outside 
itself, the concept Bildung transcends that of the mere cultivation of given talents. 
(Gadamer, 1989, p. 11)  
 
Bildung is not a point of graduation, more a mode of being that knows how to keep the different 
horizons informing experience in constant play. The play is crucial for, as we have argued, it sets 
the circumstances out of which unexpected hermeneutic effects can arise.  
 
In Hermeneutic Workshops 
 
In the essay The Idea of the University Gadamer asserts that the very task of university education 
is to “find free spaces and learn to move therein” (1992, p. 59). Education is thus a matter of 
finding the “truly open questions and therefore the possibilities that exist.” Moving into this 
openness is a passage into something more than something known, more than something 
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learnable “… it is a passage into a place where something happens to us” (p. 59). Gadamer’s 
invocation of the “free space” offers a useful summary point for our argument. 
 
1. The “free space” Gadamer’s speaks of is the space of hermeneutic inter-play between 
the indeterminancy of all linguistic meaning and the impetus to completion. 
 
2. The impetus to completion seeks to actualise many of the possibilities for meaning 
held within the indeterminate horizons of language. Hermeneutic practice is educative 
in that it draws out possibilities for new insight from what is already at play within our 
personal and collective horizons of understanding. 
 
3. Hermeneutic practice is attentive to that space of inter-play. Within that space, 
hermeneutic practice is a way of encouraging the emergence of new modes of 
understanding by reason of our involvement in that space and not because of any 
deliberate intention. 
 
There is an obvious critical riposte. How can such spaces be free when all cultural, linguistic 
spaces are determinate spaces? They cannot be, by definition, pre-suppositionless spaces. If they 
were, they could not be places of possibility. Skorupski comments that after Kant, “truly free 
thought… must investigate the conditions of its own possibility.”2 Gadamer describes the task of 
hermeneutics as enquiring into the very conditions of understanding. Free thought for Gadamer 
is not a question of pre-suppositionless understanding but of freeing thought from being 
exclusively concerned with the everyday in order to allow that which is already at play-within-
one’s thinking to unfold its possibilities. This indicates how close Gadamer remains to Lessing 
and Humboldt and their notions of history as the self-education of mankind. As John Burrows 
observes,  
 
This concept (Bildung) contained, or could be invested with… the pre-supposition of an 
inner, spontaneous vitality, and of an, underlying coherence or pattern working itself out 
through an immense diversity and gaining nourishment from it, and of a creative, 
reciprocal relation to experience, in which even error and suffering were made 
meaningful through the concept of education. (Burrows, 1969, p. xviii) 
 
The parallel with Gadamer’s Hegelian notion of the negativity of experience and its classical 
roots in Aeschylus’s conception of pathei mathos is striking. However, the useful aspect of this 
critical riposte is that offers the occasion to re-emphasize that Gadamer’s appeal to a situated 
free space is an appeal to set free the possibilities that are already within our hermeneutic 
horizons. In this respect, Gadamer’s free space is closer to Heidegger’s notion of an “opening” or 
clearing. 
 
The freedom of the open consists neither in unfettered arbitrariness nor in the constraint 
of mere laws. Freedom is that which conceals in a way that  opens to light, in whose 
clearing there shimmers that veil that hides the essential occurrence of all truth and lets 
                                                 
2 John Skorupski, Why Read Mill today? (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 6. I am indebted to 
Robert Stern’s “Hegelian Metaphysics,” Oxford Scholarship On-line (Sep. 2009): doi: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239108.001.0001. 
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the veil appear as that which veils. Freedom is the realm of destining that at any given 
time starts a revealing upon its way. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 25) 
 
These remarks emphasize that freedom and free thinking involve not a vacuous, pre-
suppositionless space but rather an acceptance of that which comes to and unfolds before us as a 
specific and actualisable set of existential possibilities. These remarks might strengthen the 
charge that the “free space” in question is the unfree space of tradition but, as we have 
commented, a truly pre-suppositionless space would be a space without possibility and, hence, 
without the opportunity for action. Without the exercise of hermeneutic practice, the generation 
of new insight is seriously diminished. A hermeneutically orientated education has to aspire to 
the public and private pursuit of those “free spaces” capable of drawing out those yet to be 
realised possibilities already at play within our various horizons of understanding. A 
hermeneutically orientated education would entail the acquisition of those modes of attentive 
looking and reflection attuned to keeping those horizons in play. By perpetuating such movement, 
hermeneutic practice would create the conditions whereby emergent and transformative insight 
arise by default of engagement and participation rather than by deliberate planning or intention. 
In so far as such a mode of education initiates its participants in processes of extensive, profound 
but controlled intellectual and personal change, it is hard to think of what greater relevance to the 
practical and spiritual health of society the humanities could have. 
 
A Virtuous Practice 
 
We have argued that hermeneutic practice involves the inter-play of the indeterminacy of all 
linguistic meaning with the impetus to completion. The impetus to completion strives to actualise 
anticipated possibilities for meaning held within the indeterminate horizons of language. 
Hermeneutic practice is educative in that it draws out both anticipated and unexpected insights 
from what is already at play within our personal and collective horizons of understanding. As a 
way of encouraging the emergence of new modes of understanding, hermeneutic practice also 
generates its own effects. We might call these effects the virtues of hermeneutic practice. What 
virtues does the practice hermeneutics instill? The key dispositions are: 
 
1. A sensitivity to how the local and particular is resonant the transcendent. The quest 
for completeness in horizons of linguistic indeterminacy necessarily leads to the 
emergence of meanings other than the expected. The emergence of such disruptive 
moments explodes the cogito of everyday consciousness and exposes it to the 
speculative reality that transcends each and every ego. Hermeneutics gives expression 
to a philosophy of praxis that opens self-consciousness to the speculative dimensions 
of the speech-created world that transcends it. Hermeneutic practice respects the local 
and particular as a gateway to the speculative reality beyond it. 
 
2. A faith in the always-more to be seen or understood. Attention to hermeneutic detail 
encourages a patient reflective distance, an awareness that what a hermeneutic 
experience reveals of a work’s meaning is never complete or final. Hermeneutic 
practice cautions against any rush to judgment: No text or art work discloses itself 
completely; there is always something more that can be said. 
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3. A readiness for the unexpected. Exposure to the unexpected hermeneutic emergence 
does not deny the need for planning in any enterprise but recognizes that planning can 
have unexpected consequences and be frustrated by unforeseeable events. The 
incommensurability between the indeterminacy of linguistic meaning and the impetus 
to completion enables the humanities to become workshops for generating and coping 
with the unpredictable. 
 
4. An open and patient disposition toward the possible. Hermeneutic practices encourage 
opening not toward emptiness but toward hitherto unseen possibilities within the seen. 
Hermeneutic practices reveal how all emergent phenomena can be other than how they 
present themselves. No interpretive task can formally be judged complete in that a text 
or artwork can always in principle reveal other of its aspects. Learning within the 
humanities is never complete.  
 
5. A willingness to take part in communicative exchange. Although philosophical 
hermeneutics correctly emphasizes that dialogical exposure to pre-suppositions other 
than one’s own can make one think differently about one’s initial points or orientation, 
the very act of participating in dialogue can have unintended effects. A certain 
accidental turn of phrase or a chance association of images can offer surprise closures 
of meaning within a certain horizons of expectancy. Not only is individual 
participation a force for collective emergence but simply by being willing to speak we 
can unbeknown to ourselves help others to come to an unexpected understanding. 
 
6. A courageous openness to experience and inter-disciplinarity. A hermeneutic 
orientation to leaning becomes ever more conscious of the fact that experience 
concerns the process of drawing out the possibilities that are already at play within 
one’s horizon. This implies a willingness to think differently about one’s involvements, 
and to adopt different experiential and intellectual perspectives toward them, precisely 
to the end of finding in them unseen or overlooked aspects. A hermeneutic approach to 
education is acutely aware of the constant need for circumstances and experiences that 
force us to think differently. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s inter-disciplinary hermeneutics 
can be understood as an eloquent protest against the limitations of living only one life.3 
 
7. A modesty of disposition to the unknown and the unexpected. The “negativity of 
experience” always offers a painful reminder that we are not gods, that we are only too 
capable of getting it wrong, that we do not know it all, and that (thankfully) horizon of 
learning is always open. 
 
8. A detached but committed attentiveness. Hermeneutic practices establish a “free space” 
whereby the movements of the subject-matters that constitute our personal and 
collective lifeworlds can be discerned. Attending to movement in one horizon can 
induce transformative change in another. The impetus to completion drives 
hermeneutic attentiveness. Hermeneutic experience teaches, however, that rarely is it 
the meaning pursued that is productive but rather the transformative meanings which 
                                                 
3 To compare Gadamer’s stance with that of Alexander Humboldt, see the latter’s The Limits of State 
Action. 
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the quest gives rise to. Participation within the various horizons of understanding is 
key. 
 
An Open Conclusion 
 
The well-being of a tradition as well as of the horizons and concerns of a spectator require that 
they remain in motion. Movement, as Gadamer, insists is the life of the human spirit. Intellectual 
and creative renewal depends upon a degree of disruption. The vitality of social and economic 
endeavour let alone that of university education, demands adaptability and the skills of thinking 
beyond the restraints of the customary and the expected. Exposure to the strange and unexpected 
can be unsettling, but as Gadamer suggests, no one can be protected from experience (Gadamer, 
1989, p. 356). In an environment of change, a creature formed by dint of experience survives 
only by constantly questioning and testing its expectancies. Here, the social and economic 
significance of the humanities can be effectively and emphatically asserted. The practice of 
hermeneutic attentiveness across the humanities requires controlled environments within which 
participants can safely expose their cultural expectancies to the unexpected and test their 
capability for transformative response. It is impossible to predict the nature and extent of the 
challenges that the future holds but the quality and depth of response will be key. If 
transformative experience arises when the horizons of meaning attached to cultural works collide 
serendipitously with those of the spectator, the extent and creativity of the spectator’s response 
will be informed by the width of the cultural horizons they can draw on. The value of discipline 
canons is not that they perpetrate exemplary practice but that they lay down in the spectator the 
foundations of response-repertoires that only the future will probe and test. Not to invest in the 
attentive practices of the humanities; not to nurture the ability to dwell within spaces of 
hermeneutic challenge, and not to teach how to be patient in developing as yet unknown but 
wished for responses to such provocations, is to disinvest in our collective ability to respond 
creatively to the inevitable challenges of the future.  
 
Notes 
 
This was first presented as the keynote paper at the North American Society for Philosophical 
Hermeneutics Annual Conference, Roanoke College, September 13, 2014. 
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